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Insurance
by Bradley S. Wolff'
Stephen L. Cotter**
and Stephen M. Schatz***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed, and reversed, two cases
featured prominently in last year's Insurance survey article,' and it also
held a key provision of tort reform preempted by federal law.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the decision in Ryder Integrated
Logistics, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.2 and held that an

agreement to name another as an additional insured could not be used
to salvage an invalid indemnification clause in the parties' contract.3
The legislature amended Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 13-8-2 4 to help avoid this type of litigation in the future.5

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986).
Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; International
Association of Defense Counsel.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and
Insurance Practice and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
1. See Stephen M. Schatz, Stephen L. Cotter & Bradley S. Wolff, Insurance, 58 MERCER
L. REV. 181 (2006).
2. 277 Ga. App. 679, 627 S.E.2d 358 (2006), rev'd, 281 Ga. 736, 642 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
3. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 281 Ga. 736, 736, 73940, 642 S.E.2d 695, 696, 698 (2007).
4. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (1982 & Supp. 2007).
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However, both appellate courts continued to show a propensity for
finding additional insured coverage for entities with whom the named
insured has agreed to provide such coverage in a separate contract, as
long as a connection exists between (1) the claimed injury and (2) the
scope of the work set forth in the contract.6
In another case, the supreme court reversed a pass given by the
intermediate court to an automobile insurer; the insurer allegedly
conspired with an appraisal service to systematically undervalue its
policyholders' property damage claims.7 In McGowan v. Progressive
PreferredInsurance Co.,8 the supreme court held that an appraisal and
the insurer's subsequent payment of the difference between its valuation
and the appraised value did not moot the insured's claims for damages
other than the value of the car itself for claims such as fraud, breach of
contract, and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 9 ("RICO"). 10
Both appellate courts held that Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act" ("HIPAA") regulations preempted O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2,"2 the tort reform provision that requires a plaintiff to
file an authorization for the release of medical records and permission
for defense counsel to speak with treating physicians in a medical
malpractice case. 3 The supreme court adopted and expanded upon the
court of appeals' views in Allen v. Wright.4
Perhaps the most unanticipated decision of the survey period in the
insurance law arena came from the court of appeals in Abrohams v.
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency, 5 a decision that the supreme court
declined to review.16 In Abrohams the court held that a personal
umbrella liability policy's coverage extended to uninsured motorists
when the policy provided $1 million in excess liability coverage over the

5. See id. § 13-8-2(b) (Supp. 2007).
6. See Ryder, 281 Ga. at 736-37, 642 S.E.2d at 696; BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin
Paving Co., 285 Ga. App. 494, 498-99, 646 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2007).
7. McGowan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 281 Ga. 169, 170, 637 S.E.2d 27, 28
(2006).
8. 281 Ga. 169, 637 S.E.2d 27 (2006).
9. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (2007).
10. McGowan, 281 Ga. at 172, 637 S.E.2d at 29.
11. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
12. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2006).
13. Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 10-11, 644 S.E.2d 814, 815-16 (2007); Allen v. Wright,
280 Ga. App. 554, 554-55; 634 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2006).
14. 282 Ga. 9, 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
15. 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
16. See id.
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insureds' primary residence and motor vehicles, despite the fact that the
umbrella policy itself specifically stated that it did not cover uninsured
motorists.17 If an award was given for the most creative lawyering in
an insurance case, it would surely be awarded this year to the attorney
or attorneys who crafted the winning arguments in this case.
II.

COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

A. The Effect of ContractualIndemnification and Insurance Clauses
on Additional Insured Coverage
In last year's annual survey, we discussed the court of appeals decision
in Ryder IntegratedLogistics, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications,Inc.
("Ryder ,)18 and predicted that the supreme court would address the
lower court's finding of additional insured coverage for BellSouth based
upon the appellate court's very broad interpretation of the language
"arising out of operations" in the policy's additional insured endorsement.' 9 In Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("Ryder 1"),2" the supreme court reversed Ryder I, but not
for the reasons we had anticipated.2 '
An employee of Ryder was injured while working at a BellSouth
facility. The employee sued BellSouth and claimed that the company's
sole negligence caused his injuries. BellSouth then tendered the suit to
Ryder and Ryder's commercial general liability ("CGL") carrier. The
contract between Ryder and BellSouth contained an indemnification
clause in which Ryder agreed to indemnify and hold harmless BellSouth.2 2 Because the clause did not expressly state that it applied to
BellSouth's sole negligence, the lower court correctly held that the clause
was void and unenforceable, and Ryder was not obligated to indemnify
BellSouth.2 3 However, as is typical in many construction agreements,
the contract also contained a separate insurance provision that required
Ryder to obtain CGL insurance with limits of at least $1 million to cover
BellSouth as an additional insured.24 The insurance clause contained

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 177, 181-82, 638 S.E.2d at 332, 334.
277 Ga. App. 679, 627 S.E.2d 358 (2006), rev'd, 281 Ga. 736, 642 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
Schatz, Cotter & Wolff, supra note 1, at 187-89.
281 Ga. 736, 642 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
See id. at 740, 642 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 736-37, 642 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 737, 642 S.E.2d at 697.
Id., 642 S.E.2d at 696.
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the following language: "NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OF THE ABOVE,
NO LIMIT OF INSURANCE SHALL IN ANY MANNER SERVE AS A
LIABILITY UNDER ANY PROVISION OF
LIMITATION OF [RYDER'S]
25
THIS AGREEMENT"
The court of appeals interpreted this language to mean that Ryder
itself had to indemnify BellSouth for any amount that exceeded the $1
million limit provided by the insurance coverage." The supreme court
disagreed.2 ' Because the indemnification clause was void and unenforceable, Ryder had no duty to indemnify BellSouth for BellSouth's own
negligence, and the insurance clause could not resurrect the void
indemnification clause or create any separate obligation or greater
liability.28 Therefore, BellSouth was entitled to the additional insured
coverage of $1 million provided by Ryder's CGL policy, but BellSouth
was responsible for all liability to the injured Ryder employee in excess
of the policy limit.29 Only if the indemnification clause had been valid
would30Ryder have had a duty to indemnify BellSouth beyond the policy
limit.
Ryder II reinforces the principle that insurance clauses cannot be
interpreted to create or increase one's duty to indemnify another where
no duty to indemnify exists under the separate indemnification
clause. 31 An insurance clause, however, can create additional insured
coverage for the indemnitee under the indemnitor's liability policy,
2
regardless of whether the indemnification clause is enforceable.
In its 2007 session, the Georgia General Assembly amended O.C.G.A.
section 13-8-2 3 to further clarify that a contractual party's obligation
to obtain insurance coverage in connection with a construction project is
not affected by a void indemnification clause that applies to that same
project. 4

Id. at 739, 642 S.E.2d at 697 (brackets in original).
Id.
Id. at 739-40, 642 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 737-38, 642 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 739-40, 642 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 739, 642 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 739-40, 642 S.E.2d at 698.
Ryder I, 277 Ga. App. at 686, 627 S.E.2d at 364.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (1982 & Supp. 2007).
Id. O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b), as amended, provides as follows:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or
collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration,
repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances,
including moving, demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to
require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold
harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other named

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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B. "Arising Out Of' Language Interpreted Very Broadly in Finding
Additional Insured Coverage; Loss of Subrogation Rights if Insurer
Settles Without Insured's Consent
Consistent with its ruling in Ryder I, the court of appeals established
in BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving Co.," that it will continue
to take an expansive view of the phrase "arising out of' in an additional
insured provision to determine if coverage exists. 36 BBL, a general
contractor, subcontracted with Baldwin Paving and Magnum Development (the "subcontractors") to perform work on a construction project.
The indemnification clause in the subcontract required the subcontractors to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless BBL for all claims arising
out of the performance of the subcontractors' work. The insurance
clause in the subcontract required the subcontractors to obtain liability
insurance to cover claims arising out of the subcontractors' work and for
which BBL may be liable.37 The subcontractors did obtain policies that
named BBL as an additional insured, but the policies contained
language limiting coverage to BBL for liability "arising out of' the
subcontractors' work or operations. 38 Following an auto collision near
the construction project, the claimants brought lawsuits alleging that
their injuries resulted from BBL's negligent management of the project
as well as BBL's and the subcontractors' negligent construction of the
project.39
The court held that BBL qualified as an additional insured under the
subcontractors' policies, regardless of who was ultimately at fault for the

indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, against
liability or claims for damages, losses, or expenses, including attorney fees, arising
out of bodily injury to persons, death, or damage to property caused by or
resulting from the sole negligence of the indemnitee, or its, his, or her officers,
agents, or employees, is against public policy and void and unenforceable. This
subsection shall not affect any obligation under workers' compensation or coverage
or insurance specifically relating to workers' compensation, nor shall this
subsection apply to any requirement that one party to the contract purchase a
project specific insurance policy, including an owner's or contractor's protective
insurance, builder's risk insurance, installation coverage, project management
protective liability insurance, an owner controlled insurance policy, or a contractor
controlled insurance policy.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (Supp. 2007).
35. 285 Ga. App. 494, 646 S.E.2d 682 (2007).
36. See id. at 498-99, 646 S.E.2d at 686.
37. Id. at 495-96, 646 S.E.2d at 684.
38. Id. at 498, 646 S.E.2d at 685-86 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 496, 646 S.E.2d at 684-85.
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injuries.4" Building upon Ryder I, the court broadly construed the
phrase "arising out of' the subcontractors' work or operations as
meaning "arising out of a business transaction" with or "work performed"
for BBL.4 1 The court noted that it had similarly construed "arising out
42
of' as meaning "'had its origins in,"' "'grew out of,"' or "'flowed from,'
and, therefore, "'Ta]lmost any causal connection or relationship will do"'
in satisfying the "arising out of' requirement.'
Because the injuries
were allegedly related to the subcontractors' work on the construction
project, BBL qualified as an additional insured, regardless of whether
actual liability for the injuries was attributable to BBL or to the
subcontractors."
The court's reinforcement of how broadly it will interpret the "arising
out of' language is a cautionary tale for insurers who refuse to defend
a purported additional insured entity without first examining the
contractual relationship between that entity and the named insured.
While only a slight causal connection between the injuries alleged and
the contractual scope of the work is required to find additional insured
coverage, no relationship whatsoever between the scope of the work and
the alleged injuries is required before an insurer
can have confidence
4
that additional insured coverage does not exist.
BBL is important for a second reason. An entity that seeks additional
insured coverage under a policy must "elect" such coverage by notifying
the insurer of the claim and forwarding a copy of the complaint to that
insurer. 46 However, if the insurer already has notice of the claim or
suit-for example, from the named insured-then it cannot avoid
coverage on the basis that the additional insured did not provide timely
notice.4 7
BBL has potentially far-reaching implications for a third reason.
According to O.C.G.A. section 33-7-12(a),48 when an insurance company
settles a claim or claims against the insured without the insured's
consent (which it is typically allowed to do under the terms of CGL and
automobile policies), the insurer is deemed to be an independent

40. Id. at 500-01, 646 S.E.2d at 687.
41. Id. at 498, 646 S.E.2d at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. (quoting Abercrombie v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 602, 603,
454 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1995)).
43. Id. (quoting Se. Fid. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 142 Ga. App. 562, 564, 236 S.E.2d 550,551
(1977)).
44. Id. at 499, 646 S.E.2d at 686.
45. Id. at 498-99, 646 S.E.2d at 686.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-12(a) (2000).
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contractor. 49 As an independent contractor, instead of an insurer, an
insurance company has no right of subrogation under its policy to
recover from the tortfeasor the amount the company paid to settle the
claims."' Therefore, if an insurer does not have an insured's (or
additional insured's) consent when it settles a claim, it cannot "stand in
the shoes" of its insured and subrogate against the wrongdoer.
As a practical application, if an insurer wishes to protect its subrogation rights in the future, then it will need to obtain the insured's consent
to the settlement and include in the release explicit language indicating
that it has such consent. Defense counsel for insureds should be
cautious when preparing a general "form" release and should inquire,
before settling a case, whether the insurer wishes to reserve the right to
subrogate.
C.

DiscriminationDoes Not Constitute "BodilyInjury" or "Personal

Injury"
In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Robinson,5

the district court

addressed whether coverage exists for a claim of race discrimination
against the insured who allegedly refused to sell to a bi-racial couple
land upon which they intended to build a home.52 As is typical of CGL
policies, Auto-Owners's policy had a section which provided coverage for
"bodily injury" and a section which provided coverage for "personal

49. BBL-McCarthy, 285 Ga. App. at 501,646 S.E,2d at 688. O.C.G.A. section 33-7-12(a)
provides as follows:
Any provision in a liability policy of insurance which provides that the insurer
shall have the right to compromise or settle claims of third persons against the
insured without the consent of the insured shall be deemed to create, as between
the insurer and the insured, the relationship of an independent contractor so that
the insured shall not be precluded from asserting a claim or cause of action
against third persons, notwithstanding the settlement by the insurer of such
claims of third persons, unless the insured shall previously have consented in
writing to relinquish his claim or cause of action against third persons, provided
in all cases where the insurer shall settle the claims of third persons against the
insured without written consent that it shall be the duty of the insurer to inform
the third persons in writing of the lack of consent of the insured and that the
insured is not thereby precluded from the further assertion of claims against the
third persons before taking from the third persons any release, covenant not to
sue, or other settlement; and upon failure of the insurer to give the notice to the
third persons of the lack of consent of the insured, the release, covenant not to
sue, or other settlement shall be of no effect, null, and void.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-12(a).
50. BBL.McCarthy, 285 Ga. App. at 501, 646 S.E.2d at 688.
51. No. 3:05-CV-109 (CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66551 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006).
52. Id. at *2-3.
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injury." 3 Bodily injury was defined by the policy as "'bodily injury,
sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from
any of these at one time."'54 The court confirmed that bodily injury
requires some kind of physical injury to the claimants, and it does not
include emotional or mental harm.55 While the claimants allegedly
suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress as a result
of the discrimination, they did not suffer any physical injuries, and
therefore the bodily injury section of the policy did not apply.5"
Moreover, the court stated that any physical manifestations or consequences resulting
from emotional or mental harm do not constitute
57
bodily injury.
The definition of personal injury included the "'wrongful eviction from,
wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its
owner, landlord or lessor."' 58 In holding the language unambiguous,
the court, in a case of first impression, determined that "occupies"
applies only to present occupancy, not future occupancy. 59 Because the
discrimination claim alleged interference with the right of future
occupancy of the land, there was no personal injury coverage."0

53. Id. at *6, *10. Under the standard Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO") form for
CGL policies, Coverage A provides coverage for "bodily injury" and "property damage"
caused by an "occurrence," and Coverage B provides coverage for "personal and advertising
injury" caused by an offense arising out of the insured's business. See, e.g., Form CG 00
02 12 04.
54. Auto-Owners, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66551, at *6.
55. Id. (citing O'Dell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 223 Ga. App. 578, 579, 478
S.E.2d 418, 420 (1996)).
56. Id. at *7-8.
57. Id. Many current ISO forms for CGL policies amend the definitions of bodily injury
to include mental anguish and other mental injury resulting from bodily injury. Following
the rationale of Auto-Owners, mental and emotional harm would be covered by this
amended definition only if such mental injury was caused by or resulted from a physical
injury, but no coverage would exist for mental injury that itself caused physical injury or
manifestations (such as heart palpitations, stress, nightmares, high blood pressure, etc.).
See id.
58. Id. at *10.
59. Id. at *11.
60. Id. at *11-12.
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D. Federal Courts Resistant to DeclaratoryJudgment Actions
Brought on Insurer's Duty to Indemnify When Underlying Lawsuits
Still Pending
In Erie Indemnity Co. v. Acuity6 and Utility Service Co. v. St. Paul
Travelers Insurance Co.,62 the United States District courts for the
Northern District of Georgia and the Middle District of Georgia,
respectively, refused to address in declaratory judgment actions whether
insurers have a duty to indemnify under their policies when the
underlying lawsuits against the insureds are still pending.6 3 "The duty
to indemnify, or provide coverage to, an insured party is triggered only
when the insured is determined to be liable for damages within the
policy's coverage."6" Thus, in using its discretion 65 to decline to rule
on the coverage issues, the district court observed that such a determination may be unnecessary, irrelevant, and a waste of judicial resources."
For example, if the insured defendants were to prevail at trial in the
underlying actions, then no question of coverage would even arise.6"
While the courts' rationale is understandable, such refusal to decide
a coverage dispute may put insurers in the unfortunate position of not
knowing whether to contribute toward the settlement of an underlying
suit before trial. For example, in Erie the coverage issue required the
district court to determine which of two insurance policies issued by
separate insurers provided primary coverage for a rental car's damage
caused by a collision.68 Without clarification from the federal court
concerning which policy provided primary coverage, neither insurer was
likely to contribute a substantial amount toward the settlement of the
underlying case. Thus, while the federal courts may save their judicial
resources, their decisions may require that the court hear the underlying
suit and expend even more resources.

61. No. 1:06-CV-0174-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590 (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2006).
62. No. 5:06-CV-207(CAR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4634 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2007).
63. Erie, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590, at *12; Util. Serv. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4634, at *11.
64. Erie, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590, at *6-7; Util. Serv. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4634, at *10.
65. Both courts assumed, for purposes of their findings, that an "actual controversy"
existed between the parties. Erie, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590, at *5-6; Util. Serv. Co.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4634, at *9.
66. Erie, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590, at *8-9; Util. Serv. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4634, at *10.
67. Erie, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590, at *9.
68. Id. at *2-3.
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Uninsured or UnderinsuredMotorist Insurance

1. Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage Found in
69
Umbrella Liability Policy. Under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(a)( 1),
no "automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability policy" may be
issued in Georgia unless the policy provides uninsured or underinsured
motorist ("UM") coverage in at least the statutory minimum amount or,
at the election of the insured, an amount equal to the liability coverage
provided by the policy.7" The insured may, however, affirmatively
waive UM coverage by rejecting the coverage in writing.71
In Abrohams v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency,72 the issue was
whether an insurer was required to provide UM benefits to its insureds
under a personal umbrella liability policy, which provided $1 million in
excess liability coverage over the insureds' primary residence and motor
vehicle policies. 73
The umbrella policy specifically excluded UM
coverage, stating that the insurer "'won't pay for Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists coverage or No-Fault benefits unless
such coverage is specifically shown on the Declarations Page as an
Umbrella Coverage.' 74 The policy declarations page did not list UM
as an "'Umbrella Coverage.' 75 The insurer never offered UM coverage
as part of the insureds' umbrella policy, and the insureds never rejected
such coverage in writing.7 6
The Georgia Court of Appeals stated that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11
does not define "automobile liability" or "motor vehicle liability" policies
and that nothing in the statute excludes umbrella or excess liability
policies from the requirement that automobile liability policies must
provide UM coverage.7 7 As a matter of first impression, the court
interpreted the statute broadly to apply to all policies that provide some
coverage for automobile liability. 7

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

The court concluded that to hold

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id. § 33-7-11(a)(3).
282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
Id. at 177, 638 S.E.2d at 331.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 178, 638 S.E.2d at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. See id. at 179, 638 S.E.2d at 332.
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umbrella or excess policies exempt from the UM statute would contravene the legislature's intent to provide payment for all actual losses for
which the insured is legally entitled to recover.79 Thus, the court held
that umbrella and excess policies that provide for motor vehicle or
automobile liability coverage are subject to O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11.80
Additionally, the court rejected the insurer's argument that it was
entitled to summary judgment because the policy was a renewal policy
and therefore exempt from the UM statute."' In rejecting this argument, the court noted that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(a)(3) merely provides
that an insurer is not required to increase UM coverage in renewal
policies.8 2 That statutory provision does not exempt an umbrella policy
from UM requirements.8 3 Because the insureds made no election
regarding UM coverage, the limit of coverage was equal to the liability
limit of the policy.8 4 Lastly, the court held that the provisions in the
insureds' umbrella policy that specifically excluded UM coverage
conflicted with Georgia's insurance statutes and were thus void. 5 The
supreme court denied the insurer's petition for certiorari in February
2007.8

Although the court rendered its decision based on the particular type
of insurance policy before it, the rationale of the decision in Abrohams
appears to apply equally to commercial general liability policies as well
as any liability policy that provides coverage for damages caused in the
use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. The legislature has considered
bills directed toward addressing the effect of the decision in Abrohams,
and further attempts to legislatively reverse this decision should be
expected.
2. UM Carrier Entitled to Set-Offs for Social Security and
Workers' Compensation Benefits. In Dees v. Logan, 7 the court of
appeals upheld an insurer's right to set off benefits received by the
insured from special damages awarded for lost wages and gave
practitioners some guidance on how to handle other categories of
damages.8 8 The plaintiffs in Dees, husband and wife, sued the defen-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 179-80, 638 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 180, 638 S.E.2d at 333.
Id., 638 S.E.2d at 333-34.
Id. at 181, 638 S.E.2d at 334 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3)).
Id. at 181 nn.24 & 28, 638 S.E.2d at 334 nn.24 & 28.

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 181-82, 638 S.E.2d at 334.
See Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330.
281 Ga. App. 837, 637 S.E.2d 424 (2006).
Id. at 840-41, 637 S.E.2d at 428.
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dant driver and their uninsured motorist carrier ("UMC") for injuries
sustained by the husband and for additional damages, including loss of
consortium and punitive damages. The plaintiffs settled with the
defendant driver before trial and executed a limited release; the result
being that the underinsured motorist claim would go to trial. 89 The jury
awarded damages for past lost wages, reimbursement of Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198590 ("COBRA") payments, past
pain and suffering, and loss of consortium. The trial court granted the
UMC's postjudgment motion to preclude recovery under the UM policy
because previous worker's compensation, social security disability, and
other benefit payments to the plaintiffs could be used by the UMC to
offset its obligation to pay the damages awarded by the jury. The
plaintiffs appealed on several grounds. 9'
First, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred in granting the
UMC's motion in limine to exclude evidence that the defendant driver
was under the influence of crack cocaine and might have crossed the
center line intentionally. The plaintiffs argued that the excluded
evidence constituted an aggravating circumstance relevant to the issue
of punitive damages.92 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that
none of the parties at trial were responsible for paying a punitive
damage award because (1) the plaintiffs had negotiated a settlement
with the tortfeasor that released her from liability except to the extent
of other available insurance, and (2) a UM carrier is not liable for
punitive damages.9 3 Thus, the evidence of aggravating circumstances
was properly excluded.94
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in reducing
their damages by any amount through a set-off of the workers' compensation, social security disability, and other benefits paid to the husband.95 The plaintiffs maintained that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(a)
required the UMC to pay, within applicable policy limits, "'all sums
which [the] insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.'"96 The court
disagreed in part, holding that the husband's damages for lost wages
had been properly set off by workers' compensation and disability

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 837, 637 S.E.2d at 425.
29 U.S.C. § 1161 (2000).
Dees, 281 Ga. App. at 837, 637 S.E.2d at 425-26.
Id. at 837-38, 637 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 838, 637 S.E.2d at 426.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 838-39, 637 S.E.2d at 427.
96. Id. at 839, 637 S.E.2d at 427 (brackets and alteration in original) (citing O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(a)(1)).
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benefits because the policy expressly provided for such a set-off.97
98
Relying on Ferqueronv. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
99
and Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Merchant, the
court ruled that when an uninsured motorist insurance policy's language
provides for a set-off against damages awarded to the extent that
workers' compensation, disability, or other similar benefits have been
paid to the insured, such policy language is enforceable in Georgia.1 °
The court also found support for this holding in the public policy interest
of preventing double recovery through an uninsured motorist policy. 1 '
In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the set-off was nevertheless erroneous to the extent that the benefits were used to reduce the
jury's award for damages other than those for lost wages." 2 The court
agreed, holding that when a special verdict is concerned, a set-off may
not extend to areas of damages that are unrelated to the benefits
0 3
received."
Here, the UMC remained obligated to pay the jury's
award for those damages that were not covered by the benefits received
by the plaintiffs, including damages for past pain and suffering, COBRA
reimbursement, and loss of consortium.0 4
Lastly, the court dealt with the allocation of the pre-trial settlement
0
from the tortfeasor."'
The trial court had failed to allocate the
settlement amount among the categories of damages awarded to the
plaintiffs, which the court held was error.106 Because the jury returned a special verdict rather than a general verdict, a pro rata
allocation of the settlement was required to reduce each element of the
special verdict award to evenly distribute the settlement against the
entire verdict.' °7 The court then provided a mathematical formula for
making a pro rata reduction and remanded the case to the trial court for
entry of judgment accordingly.'0°

97. Id.
98. 271 Ga. App. 572, 610 S.E.2d 184 (2005).
99. 215 Ga. App. 273, 450 S.E.2d 425 (1994).
100. Dees, 281 Ga. App. at 839, 637 S.E.2d at 427 (citing Ferqueron, 271 Ga. App. at
573-74, 610 S.E.2d at 185-86; Merchant, 215 Ga. App. at 275, 450 S.E.2d at 426-27).
101. Id. (citing Anderson v. Mullinax, 269 Ga. 369, 497 S.E.2d 796 (1998); Johnson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 541, 455 S.E.2d 91 (1995)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 839-40, 637 S.E.2d at 427.
105. Id. at 840, 637 S.E.2d at 427-28.
106. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 428.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 840-41, 637 S.E.2d at 428.
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Certiorari was initially denied by the Georgia Supreme Court on
February 5, 2007.109 Upon a motion for reconsideration, the supreme
court vacated its original order and granted certiorari with the following
question to be addressed on review: "Whether the Court of Appeals
properly ruled that, under the provisions of [the plaintiff's] uninsured
motorist policy, the jury's award of past lost wages to [the plaintiff] could
be reduced by the amount of workers' compensation and other similar
benefits paid to [the plaintiff]. See O.C.G.A. [section] 33-7-11.""1io Oral
argument was scheduled for June 2007.111

3. The Addition of a Vehicle is Not the Issuance of a New
Policy Requiring Separate Selection or Rejection of UM Coverage. In Soufi v. Haygood,"' the court of appeals ruled that an
insurer is not required to obtain a new select-or-reject form from the
insured when a new vehicle is added to an existing policy.113 In Soufi
the plaintiff insured appealed the grant of the defendant insurer's
motion for summary judgment. The insured argued that when a new
vehicle was added to her policy, the insurer was required to obtain a
from the insured to avoid the
selection or rejection of UM coverage
14
application of the statutory default. 1
The 2001 amendments to O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11 provide that if an
insured in a new policy does not either elect a lesser amount of UM
coverage or reject UM coverage altogether, the amount of UM coverage
defaults to equal the amount of liability coverage provided by the
policy." 5' However, this default provision does not apply to renewal
policies issued before the amendments." 6
In Soufi the insureds added a new vehicle to their existing policy in
August 2001, which was after the July 1 effective date of the amendments. The insurer did not obtain a new select-or-reject form when the
new vehicle was added, and the policy declarations provided that all
vehicles on the policy were covered by UM benefits in the amount of
$100,000 per person or $300,000 per accident as selected by the named
insured in 1998. In September 2002 the insured was involved in an

109. Dees, 281 Ga. App. 837, 637 S.E.2d 424.
110. Supreme Court of Georgia, 2007 Granted Certioraris, http://www.gasupreme.us/
granted-certs/gc_07.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
111. Id.
112. 282 Ga. App. 593, 639 S.E.2d 395 (2006).
113. Id. at 596-97, 639 S.E.2d at 398-99.
114. Id. at 593-94, 639 S.E.2d at 396-97.
115. See Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 181 nn.24 & 28, 638 S.E.2d at 334 nn.24 & 28.
116. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3); Tice v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 275 Ga. App. 125, 619
S.E.2d 797 (2005).
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accident while driving the vehicle added to the policy in August 2001.
The insured and the insurer disagreed on the amount of UM coverage
available to satisfy the insured's claim for damages, and the insured
filed suit.'17 The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer,
and the court of appeals affirmed.' 18 The court held that the addition
of a vehicle does not constitute the issuance of a new "policy," and
therefore, the insurer was not required to notify the insureds of the
change in O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11 or to secure a separate UM election
at the time the vehicle was added to the insured's policy." 9

4. Ladder in the Road Does Not Satisfy "John Doe" Requirement. From time to time, cases reach the court of appeals concerning
motorists' collisions with, or because of, objects in the roadway instead
of collisions with other motor vehicles. The plaintiffs in these cases
usually claim that they are entitled to recover UM benefits from their
insurers because their collisions were caused by the negligence of an
unknown "John Doe" motorist who left the object in the roadway. 2 °
In Hohman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Automobile Insurance
Co.,12 the insured alleged that due to the negligence of "John Doe," a
ladder laid in the highway, which caused another driver to swerve into
her path, setting off a chain of events that resulted in a collision and
injuries. The insurer contended that the claim was fatally defective
under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11.122 The insurer maintained that under
the statute, recovery is only permitted when either (1) actual physical
contact occurs between the unknown vehicle and the insured or (2) when
the insured's description of how the accident occurred is corroborated by
an eyewitness. The insurer further contended that, here, although
witnesses could corroborate the insured's version of the events leading
to and including the collision, no witness-including the insured-could
testify that the ladder had fallen into the roadway from a vehicle. The
insurer thus concluded that no evidence was submitted that could satisfy
the insured's burden to show the existence and liability of a phantom

117. Soufi, 282 Ga. App. at 593-94, 639 S.E.2d at 396-97.
118. Id. at 593, 639 S.E.2d at 396.
119. Id. at 596-97, 639 S.E.2d at 398-99.
120. See, e.g., Hambrick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 260 Ga. App. 266, 581 S.E.2d
299 (2003); Torstenson v. Doe, 257 Ga. App. 389, 571 S.E.2d 432 (2002); Murphy v. Ga.
Gen. Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 501, 431 S.E.2d 147 (1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Guest, 203 Ga. App. 711, 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992); Scott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App.
296, 407 S.E.2d 492 (1991).
121. 283 Ga. App. 430, 641 S.E.2d 650 (2007).
122. Id. at 430-31, 641 S.E.2d at 651 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (Supp. 2007)).
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vehicle operator. 123 The court agreed and then rejected the insured's
argument that a jury could infer that the ladder fell from a vehicle onto
the highway.124 In rejecting this argument, the court observed that
because a ladder is not an "integral part" of a motor vehicle, the rule of
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Guest,'25 which affords an insured
an inference that the integral part came from a motor vehicle, did not
apply. 26 Thus, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of
127
summary judgment to the insurer.
5. Relaxed Standard for Seeking Publication Service Before
Expiration of Limitations. Last year's survey included the usual
cases in which a trial court found that a plaintiff failed to exercise the
appropriate due diligence in locating a tortfeasor, which is required to
toll the limitations period, and the court therefore dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaints.1 28 This year, in Luca v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,129 a trial court employed similar reasoning
in dismissing the case, but the court of appeals reversed because of
particular facts concerning timing issues before trial. 3 °
Luca filed a negligence action in December 2003 against defendant
Castro because of an automobile collision in May 2003 and timely served
her UM carrier. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant in
December 2003 and March 2004, but the sheriff's office reported on both
occasions that the defendant was in Mexico. The plaintiff made three
requests for permission to serve the defendant by publication before the
limitations period expired, but the period expired while the last request
was pending. On the UM carrier's motion to dismiss, the trial court
found that the plaintiff had failed to exercise proper diligence to ensure
that Castro was located and served as quickly as possible, 3' and
relying on Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,132
the trial court granted the UM carrier's motion to dismiss the lawsuit.'3 3 The court of appeals reversed based on the distinction between

123.
124.
125.
126.
713-14,
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 430-32, 641 S.E.2d at 651.
See id. at 432, 641 S.E.2d at 651.
203 Ga. App. 711, 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992).
Hohman, 283 Ga. App. at 432, 641 S.E.2d at 651 (citing Guest, 203 Ga. App. at
417 S.E.2d at 422).
See id. at 433, 641 S.E.2d at 652.
See Schatz, Cotter & Wolff, supra note 1.
281 Ga. App. 658, 637 S.E.2d 86 (2006).
Id. at 662, 637 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 658-59, 637 S.E.2d at 86-87.
242 Ga. App. 313, 529 S.E.2d 439 (2000).
Luca, 281 Ga. App. at 660, 637 S.E.2d at 87.
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a plaintiff's duty before and after the expiration of the limitations
period.13 4 Prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, and in
accordance with O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(e), the plaintiff is required only
to show that the defendant driver has either departed the state 1or35
cannot, after due diligence is exercised, be found within the state.
After the statute of limitations expires, a higher due diligence standard
is used to determine whether service accomplished outside the limitations period relates back to the time of filing and thus tolls the statute
of limitations. 136 In this case, all three of the plaintiff's requests were
made within the two-year limitations period and consequently, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal
because it had erroneously
1 37
applied the higher due diligence standard.
B. Appraisal Clause Does Not Preclude Insurer's Liability for Alleged
Scheme to Defraud Policyholders
In last year's annual survey, the authors reported that in McGowan
v. ProgressivePreferredInsurance Co., 13 the Georgia Court of Appeals

upheld the enforceability of appraisal provisions commonly found in
Georgia automobile insurance policies.'39 Affirming the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals held that payment for the full appraisal
value of the insured's vehicle mooted the insured's claims for fraud,
breach of contract, and Georgia RICO violations against the insurer.140
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the issue and
reversed the court of appeals pro-insurer decision in McGowan.'
The case arose out of the plaintiff Mary Walker's claim 4 2 that State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm") had conspired with
CCC Information Services ("CCC"), a company that provides loss
valuations to insurance companies, to intentionally undervalue
automobile property damage claims. The trial court ordered the
enforcement of an appraisal provision in the State Farm insurance
contract, which resulted in a total-loss valuation that was greater than
the amount initially determined by State Farm. State Farm paid the

134. Id. at 663, 637 S.E.2d at 90.
135. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e).
136. Luca, 281 Ga. App. at 660, 637 S.E.2d at 88 (citing Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277
Ga. App. 437, 439, 626 S.E.2d 628, 631 (2006)).
137. Id. at 663, 637 S.E.2d at 89-90.
138. 274 Ga. App. 483, 618 S.E.2d 139 (2005), rev'd, 281 Ga. 169, 637 S.E.2d 27 (2006).
139. Id. at 483, 618 S.E.2d at 141-42.
140. Id.
141. McGowan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 281 Ga. 169, 637 S.E.2d 27 (2006).
142. Companion claims filed by Harry McGowan and Dorothy Dasher were withdrawn
prior to the supreme court's decision. Id. at 170 n.1, 637 S.E.2d at 28 n.1.
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higher valuation determined from the appraisal process, and the trial
court dismissed Walker's fraud, breach of contract, and RICO claims.
The court found that these issues were rendered moot in light of the
appraisal process and the resulting higher payment for the value of
Walker's vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed.' 43
The Georgia Supreme Court analyzed the appraisal clause in the
insurance contract and determined that by its own language, the
purpose of the appraisal clause was only to provide a method by which
the insurer and the insured could make a final determination regarding
the actual cash value of a totaled car when there was a dispute
concerning the car's value." The court concluded that the clause did
not attempt to provide a means of addressing broader issues, such as the
insurer's potential liability to an insured for other claims made in a
lawsuit.'45 Here, the fraud, breach of contract, and RICO claims
concerned more than just a determination of the actual cash value of the
vehicle. Based on the allegations in Walker's complaint, this case
included not only a good faith dispute over the amount State Farm was
required to pay Walker for the totaled vehicle, but also a pre-existing
scheme between State Farm and CCC to ensure that no one would be
paid properly under State Farm insurance contracts. The damages
actually resulting from the alleged fraudulent scheme and breach of
contract included the value of the car, the expense that the plaintiff
incurred by not having use of a car, and the expense that the plaintiff
incurred in being forced to hire an appraiser to show that the car was
being undervalued. Because the issues raised in Walker's claim reached
beyond the actual cash value of the vehicle, the appraisal clause, which
simply addressed the issue of value, could not render other issues of
liability moot. 46 The court further explained that expanding the scope
of the appraisal clause beyond the issue of value is tantamount to
converting the appraisal clause into an arbitration clause, and arbitration clauses are impermissible in contracts between insurers and
insureds.'47 Because the decision by the trial court and the court of
appeals impermissibly expanded the scope of State Farm's appraisal
clause, the supreme court reversed.'"

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 170, 637 S.E.2d at 28.
at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 28.
at 172, 637 S.E.2d at 29.
at 172-73, 637 S.E.2d at 29 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (2007)).
at 173, 637 S.E.2d at 29-30.

2007]

INSURANCE

213

C. Insurer Not Entitled to DeclaratoryJudgment Regarding Second
Insurer's Obligations
In State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Property &
Casualty Insurance Co. ,149 the court of appeals held that the trial court
should have dismissed an insurer's petition for declaratory judgment
because the insurer impermissibly sought a ruling concerning a second
insurer's obligations when the first insurer had no uncertainty about its
own obligations that would warrant declaratory relief.15 ° Prior to the
instant case, Jodie Gilbert, the insured decedent, was killed in an
automobile accident, and the Pelhams, who were also involved in the
accident, filed a personal injury action against her estate. Metropolitan,
one of the decedent's insurers, filed a separate action for a declaratory
judgment concerning State Farm, another insurer, and its obligations to
the decedent's estate. In its petition, Metropolitan admitted that it had
issued a personal liability policy that covered the decedent and obligated
it to defend the personal injury action against the decedent's estate.
However, Metropolitan sought a declaratory judgment that State Farm
also had liability coverage for the decedent and the accident. 5'
Metropolitan claimed that it was exposed to uncertainty with regard
to State Farm's duty to defend and pay any judgment against the
decedent's estate. Metropolitan then claimed that it was also exposed
to uncertainty regarding the extent of coverage available to pay claims
against the decedent's estate-information it needed to make a
reasonable assessment of how to resolve potential settlement demands.
According to Metropolitan, this information was necessary to ensure (1)
that the insured was not subjected to an excess verdict and (2) that
Metropolitan was not subjected to penalties and damages for bad faith
in not settling the claim. State Farm answered by denying liability
coverage for the decedent and stating that Metropolitan was not entitled
to a declaratory judgment. State Farm claimed that Metropolitan's
action was not a proper subject matter for declaratory relief because
Metropolitan was not seeking guidance regarding its own liability, but
rather it was seeking a determination of another insurance company's
liability. 152
The trial court granted summary judgment to Metropolitan, but the
court of appeals reversed.1 53 The court held that although the declara-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

284 Ga. App. 430, 643 S.E.2d 895 (2007).

Id. at 432, 434, 643 S.E.2d at 897-99.
Id. at 430-31, 643 S.E.2d at 896-97.
Id. at 431-33, 643 S.E.2d at 897-98.
Id. at 432, 643 S.E.2d at 897.
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tory judgment statute states that it should be liberally construed, the
statute was never intended to apply to every question arising from any
justiciable controversy.1 5 4 Further, the court held that Metropolitan
had neither shown any facts or circumstances whereby it was in a
position of uncertainty or insecurity caused by the dispute over State
Farm's coverage, nor had Metropolitan shown it had to take some future
action which, without direction from the court, might reasonably be
jeopardized. 115 The court noted that State Farm denied coverage in
the underlying lawsuit, and Metropolitan conceded its obligation to
defend the personal injury action.15
Because the amount and existence of liability was one of the issues to be determined in the underlying tort action, Metropolitan did not show that an adjudication of State
Farm's obligations prior to trial of the personal injury action was
necessary to relieve Metropolitan from any risk of taking undirected
action that would jeopardize its interest. "57
'
Nor was Metropolitan's
concern about its obligation to negotiate a settlement if a demand were
made in excess of its limits sufficient to authorize a declaratory
judgment.1 8 Indeed, the court cited Cotton States Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Brightman 9 and noted that the supreme court held that an
insurer does not have an affirmative duty to engage in negotiations for
settlements that exceed the insurance policy limits or to make a
counteroffer to every settlement demand constituting a condition beyond
the insurer's control. 60
D. Local Government Insurers' Liability for Injuries Caused by
School Bus Can Be Limited to Medical Payments Coverage
School boards are statutorily required to acquire no-fault insurance
coverage insuring the children transported by school buses against
bodily injury or death.'
The amount of this insurance is left to the
school board's discretion. 6 ' In a dispute over which provision in a
school board's insurance policy should be construed as the required nofault accident coverage, the court of appeals held in Coregis Insurance

154.

Id.

155. Id. at 433, 643 S.E.2d at 897-98.
156. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 898.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
160. Metropolitan, 284 Ga. App. at 433-34, 643 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Brightman, 276
Ga. at 684, 580 S.E.2d at 521).
161. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 (2005).
162. Id.
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Co. v. Nelson16 ' that the medical payments ("med-pay") coverage, not
the liability coverage of the policy, applies to a student's injury.64 In
Coregis a middle-school student was burned apd disfigured by a
backfiring bus. The child's mother made a claim, and the insurer paid
the $5,000 limit of its policy's med-pay coverage. The policy also had a
provision for liability insurance in the amount of $1 million. The mother
contended the liability limits were available to pay additional sums for
the child's injury, and the insurer denied any obligation to pay more
than the med-pay limit. When the mother brought a lawsuit, the
insurer filed a motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue. The
trial court denied the motion and found that the med-pay provision of
the policy did not satisfy the no-fault requirements of the statute and
that the separate liability coverage provision of the policy afforded the
statutory coverage. The case then went to trial solely on the question of
damages, and the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the
verdict of almost $100,000 (giving the insurer a $5,000 credit for its prior
payment of medical expenses).' 65
The court of appeals vacated the judgment and held that the plain
language of the policy clearly showed that the med-pay coverage was
intended to serve as the no-fault accident coverage required by the
statute. 6 6 The policy provided that the insurer "'will pay reasonable
expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services to or for an
insured who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident"' and did not
condition the recovery of proceeds on legal liability. 6 7 In contrast, the
liability coverage required the insurer to "'pay all sums an insured
legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury.., to which this
insurance applies.' 16 ' The court did not reach the question of whether
the policy was required to provide coverage for more than medical or
funeral expenses, but it noted that even if the medical payments
provision did not provide the full coverage required by the statute, the
outcome would be the same because the insurer's liability was capped by
the amount of no-fault coverage offered by the policy.'69 Because
recovery under that provision was capped at $5,000, which had already

163. 282 Ga. App. 488, 639 S.E.2d 365 (2006).
164. Id. at 492, 639 S.E.2d at 369.
165. Id. at 488-89, 639 S.E.2d at 366-67.
166. Id. at 491, 639 S.E.2d at 368.
167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
169. Id. at 491-92, 639 S.E.2d at 369.
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been paid to the child, the court held that summary judgment should
have been awarded to the insurer. 70
E. Intra-FamilyExclusion for Amounts Over Statutory Minimum
Upheld
In Hoque v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 7 ' the court of
appeals affirmed a trial court's determination that an insurer's
72
intrafamily liability exclusion was not void as against public policy.'
The decedent driver rented a car and received mandatory liability
insurance from National Casualty Insurance ("National") as part of the
transaction. The driver also elected coverage under a supplemental
liability insurance policy issued by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. ("Empire"). The policy excluded coverage for losses resulting from
claims brought by family members of the insured. When the decedent
and his wife were subsequently killed while driving, the administrator
of the wife's estate received the proceeds of the mandatory liability policy
from National. Empire, citing the policy exclusion for claims brought by
family members, refused payment under the excess policy. The wife's
estate sued and claimed the exclusion was void as contrary to public
policy."'
Because Georgia does not require liability insurance in every case,
"'exclusions are not per se prohibited but must be individually evaluated
to determine whether they are against public policy."" 74 Exclusions
are upheld when they do not unfairly penalize an innocent victim or
expose the insured to unanticipated liability.'7 5 The Georgia Supreme
Court refused to enforce an intrafamily exclusion in GEICO v. Dickey,'76 but that exclusion was contrary to public policy only to the
177
extent that it conflicted with Georgia's compulsory insurance law.
Similarly, in Stepho v. Allstate Insurance Co.,178 an intrafamily
exclusion was held to violate public policy because it left the victim
unprotected by insurance coverage.1' 7 In Hoque the court of appeals
held that the intrafamily exclusion did not conflict with Georgia's

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 492, 639 S.E.2d at 369.
281 Ga. App. 810, 637 S.E.2d 465 (2006).
Id. at 811, 637 S.E.2d at 466.
Id.
Id. (quoting S. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. 355, 356,

359 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1987)).
175.

Id.

176.

255 Ga. 661, 340 S.E.2d 595 (1986).

177.
178.
179.

Id. at 662, 340 S.E.2d at 596.
259 Ga. 475, 383 S.E.2d 887 (1989).
Id. at 477, 383 S.E.2d at 889.
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compulsory insurance law because the decedent driver was insured, and
the wife's estate was compensated under National's liability policy 1for
80
the full amount required by the compulsory insurance statute.
Therefore, Empire's intrafamily exclusion did not violate public policy
because it did not prevent recovery of the compulsory minimum
amount.'
Because the decedent consented to the exclusion,
and
8 2
public policy did not invalidate it, the exclusion was enforced.
F "Second Permitee Doctrine"Precludes Coverage for Family Use of
Employer's Vehicle
In Hamrick v. American Casualty Co.,'
Judge Robert Vining
applied the substantive state law of Georgia to evaluate an insurance
policy issued by American Casualty to its insured, Georgia Piping, and
determined that the insurer owed no duty to a family member of the
insured's employee who used the employer's vehicle. 8 4 Georgia Piping
gave permission to its employee to drive its pick-up truck to and from
work. The employee allegedly gave permission to his stepson to drive
the truck on an errand, and the truck collided with the plaintiffs'
vehicle. After obtaining a judgment against the stepson and acquiring
assignment of the stepson's rights against American Casualty, the
plaintiffs filed suit against American Casualty and alleged breach of the
insurance policy covering the stepson.8 8
To determine whether
American Casualty had a duty to pay for the stepson's liability under its
policy with Georgia Piping, the court applied Georgia's "second permittee
doctrine," which provides that permissive use occurs when a third person
uses a vehicle via another person who did have permission to use the
vehicle, so long as the use falls within the scope of the original
permission. 186
The test for determining whether a third party's use falls within the
scope of permission is "(1) whether the owner's permission to the first
permittee included the use to which the third person put the [vehicle],
and (2) whether the scope of the permission the third person received

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Hoque, 281 Ga. App. at 812, 637 S.E.2d at 466 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1)(A)).
Id., 637 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 812-13, 637 S.E.2d at 467.
No. 4:06-CV-032-RLV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8823 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2007).
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from the first permittee exceeded the scope of permission given the
first permittee by the owner."" 7
The plaintiffs argued against the defendant's summary judgment
motion by alleging that material facts were in dispute regarding the
stepson's permission from his father.1 8 8 The court disagreed, holding
that the proper determination is the scope of permission given by the
18 9
owner to its employee-an issue that was not materially in dispute.
To establish that the stepson's use was not within the scope of permission given by Georgia Piping to its employee, the defendant presented
evidence of frequent meetings informing employees of use restrictions on
company vehicles and produced a policy document that the father had
signed acknowledging his responsibility to limit use of the truck to
authorized personnel. 190 According to the court, the plaintiffs' evidence
of the numerous times the father let his stepson drive the truck and
affidavits establishing the father and other Georgia Piping employees
used work trucks for personal errands, merely established how the work
truck was actually used rather than the scope of permission given by
Georgia Piping.'91 Because the stepson used the truck to run a
personal errand, which was not within the scope of permission given by
Georgia Piping, the court held there was no coverage for the stepson's
liability under the American Casualty policy.192
IV. HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
Because the courts consistently enforce contractual suit limitations
contained in homeowner's insurance policies, the Georgia Insurance
Commissioner lengthened the contractual suit limitations permitted by
regulation from one year to two years, rejecting four years as was
originally proposed.'93 Following a consistent line of Georgia precedent, the court of appeals, in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Pawlowski,' concluded that a one-year contractual suit limitation was binding and that the insured's claims of fraudulent inducement

187. Id. at *6 (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 219 Ga. App. 84, 85,
464 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1995)).
188. Id. at *8-9.
189. Id. at *8.
190. Id. at *6.
191. Id. at *7.
192. Id. at *10.
193. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-19-.01, -19-.03, -20-.01 to -.03 (2006) (effective on four
policies written or renewed after June 20, 2006).
194. 284 Ga. App. 183, 643 S.E.2d 239 (2007).
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were factually insufficient. 195 Additionally, the court was quick to rule
out a letter from Rimkus Consulting Group-referring to mold causing
injury to people-as incompetent evidence and inadmissible hearsay.' 9
The court specifically rejected the claim that res ipsa loquitur could
197
establish the link between mold and injury.
In another mold case, Balkcom v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co.,'
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
enforced a one-year suit limitation, even though the claimant alleged
that the limitation did not begin to run until the insured was subjectively aware of the latent mold damage.'9 9 The court quoted an Indiana
State Court: "'The vast majority of courts that have considered this
issue have held that the policy limitation runs from the date of the
occurrence of the destructive event."'20 0 This holding is consistent with
Georgia precedent regarding the statute of limitations running from the
date 1of injury in the property damage context, not the date of discov20
ery.
In another Northern District opinion, Nguyen v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,2"2 this time by Judge J. Owen Forrester, Allstate's one-year suit
limitation was summarily upheld and enforced. 0 3 In Option One
Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2 4 a more lengthy opinion,
Judge Forrester again applied Allstate's suit limitation, this time in the
face of a litany of alleged acts by Allstate that lulled the insured into a
false sense of security, wherein the court did not find fraud of any
type. 0 5 This collection of reported opinions enforcing the suit limitations makes it clear that, absent proof of unusual admissible facts
constituting an insured's waiver of a suit limitation, the limitations will
be enforced as written in the contract, subject to the insurance commissioner's approval of the length of that suit limitation.

195. Id. at 184, 643 S.E.2d at 241.
196. Id. at 185-86, 643 S.E.2d at 242.
197. Id. at 186, 643 S.E.2d at 242.
198. No. 1:04-CV-2348-TCB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62754 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2006).
199. Id. at *8.
200. Id. (quoting Brunner v. Econ. Preferred Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1317, 1318-19 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992)).
201. See Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 366, 368 S.E.2d 732,
733 (1988) (holding that the statute of limitations for a property damage case begins to run
"after the right of action accrues").
202. No. 1:06-CV-0883-JOF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5084 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 2007).
203. Id. at *2-3
204. No. 1:05-CV-0836-JOF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75658 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 3, 2006).
205. Id. at *17-19.
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Other homeowner's insurance opinions make it clear that courts
literally enforce the policy agreement as is, rather than reaching beyond
the four corners of the record. In Varsalona v. Auto-Owners Insurance
Co., 20 6 the Varsalonas secured an Auto-Owners insurance policy on the

"resident premises" in which they did not ultimately reside.0 7 The
court of appeals concluded that construction of the contract was not
required because there was no ambiguity and that the policy excluded
the loss because the premises were never used as the insureds'
2 °s failure to
residence. 0 ' Read your policy. In Hattaway v. Conner,
include the document constituting a misrepresentation (if any) was fatal
to the case and required that "an appellate court must assume that the
judgment below was correct," and therefore, the trial court's grant of
summary judgment was affirmed.210 Check your record.
In Cordell v. Pacific Indemnity,211 an extracontractual litigation,
Judge Vining published several orders regulating the nuances of
extracontractual practice.212 On a motion to amend a breach of
contract action into an extracontractual "negligent investigation" count,
the court concluded that there were sufficient facts alleged to justify the
right to amend in such a cause of action and that "leave shall be freely
given." 213 The court was next asked to determine the proper line of
demarcation between proper discovery and materials protected by Rule
26(b)(3)(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 4 (materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation).1
The court ultimately held
that merely having suspicion regarding a claim is not the same as taking
action in the form of sending the file to the Special Investigative
Unit.216 With this determination, the court manifested recognition
that the claim was headed to litigation. 27" The overt action taken
seems to establish a reasonable bright line test for other courts to
consider.

206. 281 Ga. App. 644, 637 S.E.2d 64 (2006).
207. Id. at 644-45, 637 S.E.2d at 65-66.
208. Id. at 646, 637 S.E.2d at 67.
209. 281 Ga. App. 20, 635 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
210. Id. at 22, 635 S.E.2d at 332.
211. No. 4:05-CV-167-RLV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46859 (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2006).
212. Id. at *14-15.
213. Id. at *4, *11-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(a).
215. Cordell v. Pac. Indem. Co., No. 4:05-CV-167-RLV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83604,
*2, *9-10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2006).
216. Id.
217. See id. at *10.
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EXCESS AND UMBRELLA INSURANCE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a
clarifying discussion of true "excess" clauses in American Casualty Co.
v. MAG Mutual Insurance Co. 21 8 MAG Mutual Insurance Co. ("MAG")
argued, and the district court agreed, that its professional liability
policy, which contained a blanket employment endorsement that
purportedly had its own "'other insurance'" clause, was excess over
American Casualty's policy.219 However, after setting forth working
judicial definitions in a detailed examination of the MAG policy, the
Eleventh Circuit held that both policies were really primary policies.22
"An 'excess' clause 'provides that an insurer will pay a loss only after
other available primary insurance is exhausted."'2 2' The court noted,
"'The general rule is that in cases of overlapping coverage, an excess
clause will prevail over a pro-rata clause."'222 Because American
Casualty policy's excess clause did not refer to "'other primary insurance"' and because the MAG policy was really a primary policy and not
a true umbrella, that rule did not apply.223 "'[U]mbrella coverages ...
are regarded as true excess over and above any type of primary
coverage, excess provisions arising in regular policies in any manner, or
escape clauses."' 224 Because the court concluded that both policies
were primary, the court held that the excess clauses cancelled each other
and that pro rata payment was in order.225 The opinion contains a
meaningful discussion of concrete definitions and rules regarding how to
apply excess clauses.226
In the umbrella area, discussed in detail elsewhere in this Article,227
the court of appeals held in Abrohams v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Agency 221 that the UM statute, O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11,229 trumped

218. 185 Fed. App'x 921 (11th Cir. 2006).
219. Id. at 923-24.
220. Id. at 926-27.
221. Id. at 925 n.2 (quoting 15 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 219:5 (3d ed. 1999)).
222. Id. at 926 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Garmany v. Mission Ins. Co., 785
F.2d 941, 947 n.6 (11th Cir. 1986)).
223. Id. (emphasis in original).
224. Id. at 927 (brackets and alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 254 Ga. 70, 77, 326 S.E.2d 206, 214 (1985)).
225. Id. at 926-27.
226. See Cordell, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83604.
227. See supra Part III.A.1.
228. 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
229. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
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an express provision of an umbrella policy which stated "'[w]e won't pay
for Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists coverage or No-Fault benefits unless ... shown on the Declarations Page.' 23" This created
significant additional UM exposure because the insurer never offered
optional UM coverage as a part of the umbrella policy.231' The opinion
brings back the Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.232 nightmare.233
In Werner Enterprises v. Markel American Insurance Co.,234 the
carrier was able to avoid a written commitment to not increase its rate
for three years when the district court found that a merger clause in the
insurance policy precluded consideration of the express and documented
arrangement. 3 5 Additionally, because the agreement was not to be
performed within one year, the Georgia statute of frauds precluded
enforcement of the express undertaking.2 36

VI.

HEALTH INSURANCE

Georgia appellate courts have begun policing of Georgia Tort Reform
in a series of opinions, all concerning inadequacies in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 23 7 due to HIPAA 23" preemption. In Northlake Medical
Center, LLC v. Queen," 9 the court of appeals held that the claimant in
a medical malpractice action was not required to file a medical record
0
authorization in compliance with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2.24 This
section contains a detailed analysis of HIPAA's provisions pertaining to
the integrity and confidentiality of patients' information. 241 The court

230. Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 177, 638 S.E.2d at 331 (brackets in original).
231. See id.
232. 156 Ga. App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980), overruled by Atlanta Cas. Co. v.
Flewellen, 164 Ga. App. 885, 300 S.E.2d 166 (1982).
233. In Jones the Georgia Court of Appeals held that noncompliance with a written
offer or rejection of supplemental "no fault" coverage meant that tender of the supplemental insurance premium could cause acceptance, ex post facto, of the supplemental coverage.
156 Ga. App. at 233-35, 274 S.E.2d at 626-28. The court of appeals overruled Jones two
years later in Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Flewellen, 164 Ga. App. 885, 890, 300 S.E.2d 166, 170
(1982) (holding that the court's ruling in Jones was "contrary to the intent of the General
Assembly").
234. 448 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
235. Id. at 1380.
236. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5) (1982 & Supp. 2007).
237. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
238. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
239. 280 Ga. App. 510, 634 S.E.2d 486 (2006).
240. Id. at 514, 634 S.E.2d at 490.
241. See id. at 510-11, 634 S.E.2d at 488-89 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2).
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applied a two-step analysis to determine whether the provisions of the
authorization requirement were preempted.242 First, it determined
that state law was contrary to HIPAA because the Georgia statute did
not require a description of the information to be used or disclosed in a
specifically meaningful fashion, and additionally, the statute did not
provide for a required expiration date or notice of the right to revoke the
Second, the court determined that none of the
authorization.243
exemptions to preemption applied. 2" The court rejected the dissent's
plea for a saving construction of the statute, holding "[i]t is not the
court's function to rewrite statutes."245
In Crisp Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Sanders,246 a panel of the court
of appeals, citing Queen, held the part of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 that
required the plaintiff to file an authorization "allowing the defendant's
attorney the right to discuss her care and treatment with all of her
treating physicians" was also, without the plaintiff's presence and
247
without prior notice to the plaintiff's attorney, preempted by HIPAA.
In Allen v. Wright,248 the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari
and issued an authoritative opinion approving all of the above discussed
court of appeals actions. 249 The supreme court held that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2 did not sufficiently comply with HIPAA and, hence, was
preempted by HIPAA with respect to the section's failure to give notice
of the patient's right to revoke the authorization, failure to require a
specific and meaningful identification of the information to be disclosed,
and failure to provide for an expiration date.25 ° Inasmuch as the
Georgia statute designated that certain aspects of the medical authorization form "shall provide," the court could not interpret the statute to also
require the insertion of HIPAA-required provisions. 25 ' Specifically,
"'Georgia law provides that the express mention of one thing in an Act
or statute implies the exclusion of all other things."'2 52 In contrast, the
dissent argued that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 could be construed with
the technical requirements of HIPAA to structure an authorization

242. Id. at 513, 634 S.E.2d at 490.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 514, 634 S.E.2d at 490.
245. Id.
246. 281 Ga. App. 393, 636 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
247. Id. at 393 n.1, 636 S.E.2d at 124 n.1.
248. 282 Ga. 9, 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
249. See id.
250. Id. at 12-13, 644 S.E.2d at 817.
251. Id. at 11-12, 644 S.E.2d at 816.
252. Id. at 13, 644 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122, 123, 610
S.E.2d 50, 52 (2005)).
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consistent with HIPAA.253 The General Assembly had an opportunity
to correct its work, as critiqued by the court of appeals, but the General
Assembly apparently decided to wait for the supreme court's final word,
given in Allen in May 2007.254 We anticipate careful construction of
a HIPAA-compliant statute during the next session of the General
Assembly.
Over the survey period, consumers of health insurance benefits
continued to not fair well in Georgia courts. In Unified Government of
Athens-Clarke County v. McCrary,25 5 the supreme court held that
retirees having "'a vested right in free health insurance at whatever
level they had at the time they retired"' did not have a retirement right
to a free Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO") plan versus a free
Health Management Organization ("HMO") plan.256 The court held
that "'Level of coverage"' does not reach the underlying source of the
insurance benefits, but rather connotes the amount or extent from some
source of insurance coverage.257
The court carefully read the fine print in Rountree v. Washington
National Insurance Co.258 to apply the promised eight percent increase
in benefits that would be enhanced from the date of the policy's inception
only as a part of the daily benefit increase option, rather than the
maximum amount benefits. 259 The court suggested that the plaintiff's
remedy may be with the insurance agent, an increasingly popular target
of claims.26 °
The court of appeals, in White v. American Family Life Assurance
Co. ,261 held that an insured's good faith in making incorrect statements
on an insurance application did not matter.2 2 The court also did not
accept the argument that the signature certifying that the statements
"were 'complete and true to the best of [the insured's] knowledge and
belief"' limited the responsibility for a good faith, yet incorrect,
representation. 26 3
The clause only had the legal significance of
precluding the signer from relying on others for the source of the

253.
part).
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 16, 644 S.E.2d at 819 (Hunstein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
See id. at 9-10, 644 S.E.2d at 815 (majority opinion).
280 Ga. 901, 635 S.E.2d 150 (2006).
Id. at 901, 904, 635 S.E.2d at 151, 153.
Id. at 902-04, 635 S.E.2d at 152-53.
No. 607CV014, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36921 (S.D. Ga. May 21, 2007).
Id. at *9-10.
See id. at *14.
284 Ga. App. 58, 643 S.E.2d 298 (2007).
Id. at 61, 643 S.E.2d at 300.
Id., 643 S.E.2d at 300-01.
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information in the application-it did not excuse inaccurate information.264
VII.

LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE

With the exception of Riggins v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., 2 6 5 an
extreme factual scenario coupled with insufficient precedent to resolve
the issue as a matter of law during this survey period, the courts
consistently applied life and disability policies as written and without
regard for the equities.
In Lake v. Young Harris Alumni Foundation, Inc.,266 the court of
appeals held that there was less than "substantial compliance" with the
terms of policy assignment requirements despite some evidence of a
desire to change the annuity policy beneficiary by Young Harris Alumni
Foundation. 267 The annuity owner had advised the carrier's agent that
she desired to change the beneficiary, but she failed to return the
written forms with her signature.2 6 This failure to complete was her
failure, rather than the failure of some third-party beyond her control,
which might have been considered substantial compliance because the
final unperformed future act would have been beyond her control.269
Similarly, when the policy clearly defined the "policy date" and
required payment of the premium before the policy was effective, the
carrier was able to successfully assert a suicide provision.27 ° In Adams
v. West Coast Life Insurance Co. ,21 the policy date was listed as July
26, 2002.272 However, the policy defined the policy date as the effective date of coverage, which specifically included "'the payment of the
premium due,"' which occurred on August 10, 2002.273 Ms. Adams
died from suicide on August 4, 2004. The issue was whether the suicide
was within the two-year suicide provision that ran from the policy
date. 274 The court noted that "'[a]n insurance company may validly

264. Id. at 61-62, 643 S.E.2d at 300-01.
265. No. CV205-138, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40102 (S.D. Ga. June 15, 2006).
266. 283 Ga. App. 409, 641 S.E.2d 628 (2007).
267. Id. at 411, 641 S.E.2d at 630.
268. Id. at 409, 641 S.E.2d at 628.
269. Id. at 412, 641 S.E.2d at 630.
270. Adams v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., No. 1:05-cv-1304-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53423, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2006).
271. Nc. 1:05-CV-1304-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53423 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2006).
272. Id. at *8.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *4-6.
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define conditions precedent to liability, ' ' 275 and thus concluded that the
payment of the premium was a clear condition precedent set forth in the
policy."'
In Dalrymple v. Protective Life Insurance Co.,277 the court held that
an application for a life insurance policy did not constitute an issued
policy because the application contained numerous misrepresentations
and omissions.7 8
Additionally, the conditional receipt agreement
terms had not been met because medical tests had not been performed.279

In Riggins v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co.,2"' perhaps due to strong

facts and uncertain law, Judge Anthony Alaimo's opinion granted grace
to the insured in the form of a jury question when premiums were not
paid on time.2"' Phoenix Life asserted it had mailed a premium notice
to the plaintiff's last known address and subsequently claimed its policy
had lapsed due to nonpayment. The carrier argued that despite a
twenty-year history of providing notice of the annual premium due, it
did not have a contractual duty to give notice. The plaintiff did not
contact the carrier for eleven months to inquire about the notice because
the post office failed to forward the plaintiff's mail.2"2
The court distinguished the 1886 Georgia Supreme Court case of
Grant v. Alabama Gold Life Insurance Co.28 3 and stated that Grant
was the only authority remotely similar to the facts in this case.2" 4 In
Grant the court held that delays of six and fifteen months before
contacting the carrier are unreasonable as a matter of law and suggested
two or three months of delay in contacting regarding annual premiums,
absent some "overpowering providential cause," should constitute intent
to decline continued coverage. 2 5 Here the issue concerned where the
notice was sent, not how it was sent.28 6 Additionally, the court deemed

275. Id. at *6 (quoting Sw. Life Ins. Co. v. Middle Ga. Neurological Specialists, 262 Ga.
273, 275, 416 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1992)).
276. Id. at *11.
277. No. 1:05-CV-01774-JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6051 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2007).
278. Id. at *12.
279. Id. at *23.
280. No. CV205-138, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40102 (S.D. Ga. June 15, 2006).
281. Id. at *1-2, 12.
282. Id. at "1-2.
283. 76 Ga. 575 (1886).
284. Riggins, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40102, at *7.
285. Grant, 76 Ga. at 582-83.
286. Riggins, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40102, at *9.
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the plaintiff's explanation potentially sufficient to qualify as "providential cause," should a jury so determine.8 7
In Thornton v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America,8 8 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia discussed
commonly encountered threshold issues to insurance litigation and
allowed the trimmed-down diversity case to proceed. 2 9 The court first
addressed the $75,000 amount in controversy issue often encountered in
diversity extracontractual litigation. 2 "
The amount of the policy
benefit was either $50,000 or $51,000.291 The court used the latter
amount, as well as the plaintiff's bad faith penalty of up to fifty percent,
to conclude that the jurisdictional amount in controversy was satisfied,
with the court noting that when attorney fees are allowable, they too
may be included in assessing the jurisdictional amount.292 Georgia's
insurance bad faith remedy includes a penalty of up to fifty percent and
reasonable attorney fees.293 While the court allowed the plaintiff's
insurance contract claim to proceed, it ordered the negligence and
295
O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11294 attorney fees claims to be dismissed;
the court concluded that there was no special arrangement to suggest
more than breach of contract and that O.C.G.A. section 33-4-629 was
the exclusive remedy for bad faith including attorney fees.297
In American General Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Ward,298 the
Northern District pruned an aggressive counterclaim. 9' The carrier
brought an action for declaratory judgment and alleged a strange
scenario of facts supporting forgery and material misrepresentation
charges. 00 Judge Julie Carnes thoughtfully considered the omnibus
counterclaim the carrier drew, and in writing for the court, she identified
potentially viable claims and terminated groundless ones.30 1 The court
dispatched as insufficient claims for criminal violations, conversion,

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at *10-11.
445 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id. at 1382 & n.1.
Id. at 1383 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2000 & Supp. 2007)).
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2007).
Thornton, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
Thornton, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
No 1:05-CV-3320-JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18420 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2007).
See id.
Id. at *5.
See id. at *6-33.
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money had and received, fiduciary duty, and Georgia RICO violations.0 2 The court found that the defendant deceased's personal
representative could pursue civil rights actions, and upon a proper
amendment under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 3
the fraud claims could stand.0 4
In Gatt v. Continental Casualty Co., 3°5 the Northern District found
insufficient factual proof to support a claim that the decedent's death
was "caused by an accident."0 6 Here, the coroner reported that Gatt's
prescription for OxyContin at the time of death should have had six pills
missing rather than twenty-one. 0 7 The Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("GBI") found a "'significant amount of oxycodone"' in Gatt's
death insurance coverage covered death
blood. 30 ' The group accidental
"'caused by an accident.' 3 9 The court noted that there is a distinction
between "accidental injuries" and "injuries resulting from accidental
means."310 An accidental injury is unexpected but arises from a
volitional act, whereas an injury from "'accidental means . . . must be
the unexpected result of an unforeseen 31or unexpected act which was
involuntarily and unintentionally done.' '
In Smith v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,31' an exhaustive
opinion concerning both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
14
of 1974313 ("ERISA") federal common law "make whole doctrine"
and Georgia's anti-subrogation statute, 15 the plaintiff was able to
prohibit the plan administrator from taking a set-off for the fruits of a
tort settlement.31 6 While ERISA permits the plan to claim the first
right of reimbursement out of any recovery, the plan's language must be
specific and explicitly reject the make whole doctrine." 7 If the plan
does not explicitly reject the concept, the make whole doctrine operates

302. Id. at "10-16.
303. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
304. Ward, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18420, at *31.
305. No. 1:04-cv-3023-GET, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64996 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2006).
306. Id. at *8.
307. Id. at *5.
308. Id. at *6.
309. Id. at 2*4.
310. Id. at *6.
311. Id. at *7 (quoting Johnson v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818, 819,
90 S.E.2d 36, 36 (1955)).
312. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
313. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
314. See Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1997).
315. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (2005).
316. Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
317. Id. at 1286 (citing Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1521).
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as a default rule as a part of the federal common law. 318 The court
also found that Georgia's anti-subrogation statute was not preempted by
ERISA and, hence, it too prohibited the administrator from taking such
a set-off.319 The court found that the anti-subrogation statute was
exempt from ERISA plan regulation because it was a law deemed to
"'regulate insurance."'32 ° Thus, the court found that the statute was
directed toward the insurance industry and substantially affected the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and insured. 2 ' This
opinion gives guidance to those who draft plans and consider taking setoffs.
The decision in Putnal v.GuardianLife Insurance Co. of America322
also turned upon the policy language, this time a disability policy
defining total disability as the inability to "'perform the major duties of
your occupation."'323 A pharmacist suffered a stroke and was left with
residual limitations. The carrier claimed that for the pharmacist to
collect benefits under the policy, the policy required that the pharmacist
be unable to perform all of the major duties of his occupation, whereas
the claimant asserted that being unable to perform just some of the
major duties of his occupation was sufficient.324 The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found the contract to be
ambiguous and, hence, interpreted it against the insurer.'
Because
a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was unable to perform
"two or more major duties" of his occupation, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was denied.326
Four opinions were issued in this survey period concerning class action
litigation against carriers failing to refund unearned insurance
premiums owed under credit life and disability policies. In J.M.I.C. Life
Insurance Co. v. Toole,327 Toole purchased a credit life and disability
insurance policy from J.M.I.C. Life Insurance Co. ("J.M.I.C.") yet
satisfied his car loan within a year, more than four years prior to the

318. Id. at 1285-86 (citing Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1521).
319. Id. at 1291-92.
320. Id. at 1291 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
321. Id. This satisfied the two requirements set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003), that
determine whether a law regulates industry and constitutes an exception to ERISA
preemption. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b).
322. No. 5:04-CV-130(HL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70931 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2006).
323. Id. at *2.
324. Id. at *11.
325. Id. at *18-19.
326. Id. at *21.
327. 280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
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expiration of the policy's term. Under O.C.G.A. section 33-31-9(c),
he was entitled to a refund of the unearned premium on the policy.329
While noting that the statute was amended, effective May 2, 2005, to
provide pre-suit notification of the carrier, the court of appeals held that
filing the lawsuit against the carrier for the unearned premium was
sufficient to satisfy any contractual condition precedent to the obligation
to return the unearned premium.33 ° The plaintiff was entitled to
retain his tort claim, insofar as it was a breach of contract and a breach
of duty imposed by law, rather than a mere breach of contract claim.33 '
The court did not disturb the class certification, the primary issue there
being whether "commonality" was shown. 32 The court distinguished
a prior opinion denying class treatment where the subjective examination of each patient's account at a hospital would have been necessary
to compute refunds. 33 3 Here, the plaintiff demonstrated to the trial
court and the court of appeals that he could prove overpayments by
electronic means which would objectively compute the amount of refunds
of unearned premiums. 34
Judge Clay Land heavily relied upon J.M.I.C. Life Insurance Co. in
three orders issued in parallel federal litigation.335
In Baker v.
American Heritage Life Insurance Co., 336 the defendant's motion to
dismiss was denied, based on the opinion in JM.I.C. Life Insurance
Co.33 7 In Bishop's Property & Investments, LLC v. Protective Life
Insurance Co.,338 Judge Land again cited to J.M.I.C. Life Insurance Co.
and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 3 9
The court also
declined to transfer venue to the Northern District of Alabama because
the court found ample connection to the Middle District of Georgia to

328. O.C.G.A. § 33-31-9(c) (2005).
329. Toole, 280 Ga. App. at 373, 634 S.E.2d at 125 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-31-9(c)).
330. Id. at 374, 634 S.E.2d at 126-27.
331. Id. at 375, 634 S.E.2d at 127.
332. See id. at 376-77, 634 S.E.2d at 128.
333. Id. (citing Winfrey v. Sw. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 383, 361 S.E.2d 522
(1987)).
334. Id. at 377, 643 S.E.2d at 128.
335. Baker v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., No. 4:05-CV-128 (CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62586, at *5-6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2006) (citing J.M.I.C. Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280
Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2005)); Bishop's Prop. & Invs., LLC v. Protective Life Ins.
Co., No. 4:05-CV-126(CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62593, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2006)
(citing J.M.I.C. Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006)).
336. No. 4:05-CV-128(CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62586 (M.D. Ga. Sept 1, 2006).
337. Id. at *5-6.
338. No. 4:05-CV-126(CDL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62593 (M.D. Ga. Sept 1, 2006).
339. Id. at *12.
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honor the plaintiff's choice of venue.3 4 ° It also rejected the strained
argument that the claim for a refund of the unearned premium fell
under the proof of loss section of the policy, which would have required
sixty days prior notice and an opportunity for resolution.341
Several months later, Judge Land rejected a defendant's claim that a
matter had become moot due to payment to the class representative.342
In reaching this decision, Judge Land applied the Zeidman v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co.3 43 "relation back" exception to the general rule that

claims must remain live throughout the
proposed class representative
344
process.
certification
The 1981 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion
in Zeidman is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit in accord with
3 45
Under Zeidman, where the class
Bonner v. City of Pritchard.
representative has filed a motion for class certification and vigorously
pursued it, the class certification can and does relate back to the filing
of the motion.34 This is necessary in certain circumstances, especially
where the claim might otherwise evade review.347 The court in
Bishop's Property & Investments, LLC found that the plaintiffs had
diligently pursued class certification and, hence, the court found that the
Zeidman exception should be employed.34

340. Id. at *6-8.
341. Id. at "13.
342. Bishop's Prop. & Invs., LLC v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382
(M.D. Ga. 2006).
343. 651 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981).
344. Bishop's Prop. & Invs., LLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-79.
345. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
346. Bishop's Prop. & Invs., LLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (citing Zeidman, 651 F.2d
at 1036).
347. See id. at 1379 (citing Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1048).
348. Id. at 1382.

